During the American war, Ho was only responding to American actions. When the Americans began to intervene by sending in military advisers in the early 1960s, Ho convened the Politburo and said we now had to send our military cadres, weapons and ammunition to the South and that we had to improve the small Ho Chi Minh Trail network. We began widening it step by step. At first, our troops carried their weapons, ammunition and supplies on their backs and on bicycles down a narrow trail. I think our most difficult moment came in 1965, when the Johnson administration changed strategy from waging a limited war with advisers and began bringing in combat divisions. But Ho wasn’t shaken. He was very decisive, very confident. He called a special political congress and ordered our infantry to move south to match the pace of the American escalation. He said the Americans can pour in 1 million troops, that the war can last 20 years, that many enterprises in Hanoi and Haiphong can be destroyed–but there’s no reason to be afraid. He mobilized the country around his saying that nothing is more precious than independence and freedom.
The Tet Offensive was key to our victory. The attack was meant to get the Americans to the negotiating table. Ho was always fighting with the goal of negotiating an American withdrawal. In 1966, Ho told me that only when we can defeat the B-52 bombers over Hanoi will the U.S. withdraw. He was right. On Dec. 28, 1972 [during the Christmas bombing of Hanoi], I heard that we had brought down 17 percent of the B-52s attacking us. And soon we received the news that the U.S. intended to negotiate its withdrawal. This shows how humans can win over steel weapons.
