Hamas grew out of the intifada, the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation that began in late 1987. It was an offshoot of an Islamic social and welfare association led by Sheik Ahmed Yassin, a quadriplegic religious leader. Ironically, Israel didn’t oppose Hamas in its early stages: it viewed the group as a useful counterbalance to the PLO, not a potentially dangerous brand of radical Islam that would later seek to destroy the state.
But in 1989 Hamas, losing popular support to Palestinian nationalists, turned to armed attacks. That year, Israeli authorities arrested Sheik Yassin, and charged him with ordering his followers to murder Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel. ““The arrest of the leadership opened the door to the younger, more activist, more radical trend,’’ says Beverley Milton-Edwards, a specialist on Islamic politics in Palestine. They recruited members from mosques and charitable institutions – often from the clinics, schools and sporting clubs that they run. ““Contrary to popular perception,’’ says Milton-Edwards, ““the people most supportive of Hamas are the educated, upwardly mobile classes of Gaza.’’ By the early 1990s, Hamas started receiving training from the Muslim Brothers in Jordan and fundamentalists returning from the Afghan war. Money poured in from Saudi Arabia, other Persian Gulf states and Iran – and even from sympathizers in the United States and Europe.
Israeli intelligence agents have had a very difficult time infiltrating Hamas – and have had little luck using collaborators and informants. Sealing the borders of Gaza and the West Bank hasn’t worked well, either. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s late 1992 banishment of more than 400 suspected Islamic militants to no man’s land in southern Lebanon only backfired: some deportees apparently learned how to make bombs there. Another lesson of their sojourn was the value of decentralization. Hamas’s military wing – whose members are said to number no more than several hundred – has now become a collection of largely autonomous and highly secretive cells. Unintimidated by Israeli and PLO authorities, Hamas has turned its wrath repeatedly on civilians inside the Jewish state and vowed to disrupt the peace process. The new Israeli-Jordanian treaty may force King Hussein to keep a more watchful eye on Hamas, but he won’t be able to stop them from funneling money to Gaza and the West Bank. In fact, a more open flow of people between the two countries should make their activities easier.
Hamas remains well positioned politically, too. While trying to avoid conflict with Palestinian police, fundamentalists have vowed to continue battling Israel. PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat can’t hammer his rivals, who have the support of roughly a quarter or more of the population, for fear of igniting civil war. And Israel can’t afford to stop talking to Arafat. At the very least, Hamas will remain a deadly player. ““We understand there is no alternative for Rabin and Arafat but to continue the process,’’ Hamas spokesman Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahhar told Newsweek before the Tel Aviv bombing. ““Hundreds of Hamas actions won’t stop it.’’ So why continue? ““This is a process of resistance to occupation,’’ he says. ““Nobody knows what the end result will be.’’ Judging by history, it will mean continued bloodshed.
Islamic militants stab a Jewish settler to death.Dec. 6: Arab gunmen kill a father of 15 and his son on the West Bank.
A U.S.-born Israeli settler kills 29 Palestinians in a mosque in Hebron.
In a reprisal, a suicide-car bombing of a school bus kills seven Israelis in Afula.
Another suicide bomber kills five Israelis on a bus in Hadera.
Six months after Hebron massacre, Islamic militants kill two Israeli workers.
A pair of Arab gunmen open fire in downtown Jerusalem, killing two bystanders.
An Israeli soldier is held hostage; a rescue attempt fails as the hostage and four others are killed.
A suicide bomber kills at least 22 on a Tel Aviv bus.
