But this season Pyongyang is hoping to prevent another “crab war.” In a gathering unprecedented since the Korean War, the top military brass from both Koreas met at a northern mountain resort on May 26 to engage in “tension reduction and trust building,” as South Korean Navy Commodore Park Jeong Hwa put it. During inter-Korean ministerial talks earlier in May, the North’s delegates shocked their southern counterparts by unexpectedly agreeing to the generals’ meeting. After a six-hour summit the two sides agreed to consider setting up a naval-command hot line, to share radio frequencies between vessels and to meet again a week later.
Though hardly a breakthrough, the summitry is one element in a broader regional charm offensive being undertaken by the Hermit Kingdom. With Washington bogged down in Iraq and unlikely to launch any new initiatives on the Korean Peninsula ahead of the November U.S. presidential election, the North is taking advantage of the diplomatic lull by playing nice with its Asian neighbors. Besides opening military dialogue with the South, Pyongyang recently hosted Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Strongman Kim Jong Il offered vague hints during the visit that he might again freeze his covert A-bomb program–a key demand by Washington and its allies following Pyongyang’s 2002 admission of a secret uranium-enrichment program. And the “Great Leader” himself traveled to Beijing in late April to shore up support from the communist ally.
What’s behind the diplomatic flurry? The North is likely looking to obtain the financial assistance, technology and market access necessary to rebuild its tattered economy, while softening the resolve of Washington’s Asian allies ahead of the next round of talks on the nuclear issue. “The need to open the economy is directly driving Pyong-yang’s diplomatic agenda,” says Daniel A. Pinkston, a senior research associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. “The resolution of outstanding security issues is necessary to fully open and capture the subsequent benefits.”
Seoul, in particular, welcomes Pyongyang’s overtures. The recent return to power of impeached President Roh Moo Hyun has shoved the country’s politics further to the left than they’ve been in a generation–much to Pyongyang’s advantage. Recent revelations that North Korea sold uranium to Libya didn’t make headlines in South Korea, where the majority view today is that the threat of Pyongyang’s nuclear program is overblown. Media reports suggest that the president will soon reinstate millions of dollars in government subsidies for inter-Korean tourism, paid to support the chaebol Hyundai for offering bus and cruise-ship tours north of the DMZ. The service nets Pyongyang tens of millions a year.
Seoul has also agreed to put up $16 million to remove land mines near a planned–and oft-delayed–industrial zone in the northern city of Gaesung, which will create thousands of jobs in the North. And last week Roh pardoned six aides to former president Kim Dae Jung who were convicted of funneling some $500 million in bribes and other payments to Kim’s regime ahead of a breakthrough North-South summit in Pyongyang in 2000. “Roh must feel tempted to use this rare opportunity,” says Paik Hak Soon, a North Korea expert at the Sejong Institute. “Another summit between the two Koreas is not impossible.” Indeed, even the conservative Grand National Party has softened its stance after losing big in April legislative elections; it no longer refers to the North as a “puppet government.”
North Korea’s diplomatic push has found an almost equally receptive audience in Tokyo. With elections for the Upper House of the Diet scheduled for July, Koizumi hoped to boost his approval ratings by returning from Pyongyang with the children of Japanese abductees taken by the North in the 1970s. Kim not only played along–permitting the release of five of the young captives–but also made positive noises about the nuclear standoff. According to the Mainichi Shimbun, Koizumi pressed Kim to follow Libya’s path to voluntary disarmament, only to be told ominously: “But Libya does not have nukes.” Yet Kim went on to say that his goal was to create a “denuclearized” peninsula, adding: “If we freeze nuclear development, it is only natural that we would allow inspections.” The fact that Kim himself raised the issue of a freeze and inspections triggered speculation that he is considering both.
Kim has material reasons to cozy up to Tokyo: he’s hoping for as much as $10 billion in war reparations for Japan’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula, which is expected to follow the resumption of diplomatic relations. But by talking over the nuclear issue, “Pyongyang is also signaling Koizumi to convey a message to Washington,” says Ichita Yamamoto, a Liberal Democratic Party Upper House member. “Kim wants the United States to soften its stance and guarantee his regime’s survival.”
Kim is sending a different message to Beijing. Just a year ago, to China’s evident horror, North Korea was openly hinting that it had developed a nuclear capability–a provocation that if confirmed could have led to a pre-emptive U.S. military strike on Beijing’s doorstep. Pyongyang has since toned down the rhetoric. And during his unofficial visit to China in April, according to accounts published in both countries, Kim agreed to “actively participate” in the next round of nuclear talks China hosts “with patience and flexibility.” That pledge earned him $50 million in emergency aid. Kim likely believes that further cooperation will lead to even more.
Whether that’s true or not isn’t yet clear. Pyongyang’s charm offensive won’t change the diplomatic landscape very much unless Kim’s regime can demonstrate–against American evidence to the contrary–that it has ceased developing nuclear weapons on the sly. Yet Pyongyang seems to have concluded that, with no deal with the United States in the offing, its diplomatic chips are best played improving its image in the region. It could lead to breakthroughs with its neighbors or, at the very least, prevent a war over crustaceans.
