How Low Would He Bow

What now? U.S.-China relations had already sunk to a post-cold-war low amid allegations of Chinese espionage and political influence peddling. When the war in Kosovo began in March, Chinese officials accused the United States of seeking global “hegemony.” And when American bombs hit its embassy, killing three Chinese journalists, Beijing accused the United States of trying to bully China with a latter-day version of 19th-century “gunboat diplomacy.” Insisting the attack was “deliberate,” Beijing said it would not talk to the United States about military contacts, international security and trade negotiations until Washington had satisfied four demands: an apology for the bombing, a full investigation, published findings and punishment for those responsible. It was clear, says a Western diplomat, that nothing but the “full kowtow treatment” would suffice.

Pickering was not authorized to bow that low. After rock-throwing demonstrators besieged the American Embassy in Beijing, the Clinton administration chose Pickering, one of America’s most respected career diplomats, to head the fence-mending mission. But Beijing officials hoped for a more senior envoy than Pickering, the No. 3 official in the State Department. They waited three weeks before agreeing to receive Pickering’s delegation, and did not even bother to announce his arrival in the state press.

Backed by officials from the Pentagon, the CIA and the National Security Council, Pickering tried to explain the bombing as a “tragic accident.” Using slides and diagrams, they outlined the mistakes that led an American B-2 bomber to drop five 2,000-pound bombs on the Chinese Embassy. First, outdated maps failed to show the new address of the Chinese Embassy, or the intended target, the Yugoslav military procurement agency. Then a U.S. intelligence officer located the agency address, incorrectly, by extrapolating from the numbering system on parallel streets. Faulty U.S. databases and NATO’s normal targeting review failed to catch the mistake, and the bomber crew, flying at night, did not see telltale markings on the Chinese Embassy.

China’s first public reaction to Pickering’s mission was a withering critique by Xinhua, the official news agency. It complained that he failed to fulfill one key Chinese demand–to identify and punish those responsible for the bombing–and it said the story of the old maps “didn’t hold water.” In fact few Chinese could believe that America, with all its high-tech prowess, could make such low-tech mistakes. “If our government accepts an explanation like this, it is no different from the Manchu dynasty,” which allowed foreign powers to humiliate China in the 19th century, said an entry on a Beijing Internet bulletin board. Having stirred up public passions, Beijing officials could hardly just drop their posture of outrage. Instead, they chose to add a new demand: compensation for the loss of three lives, injuries and damage to the embassy. “It is up to the one who ties the knot to untie it,” said Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue. “Whoever started the trouble should end it.”

The impasse has worsened, but Western diplomats still see a way out. Much has changed since 1793, when, as the story goes, a British trade envoy refused to kowtow and was sent packing with the warning that the “Celestial Empire” needed nothing from “outside barbarians.” Today, some of the same officials who are attacking American arrogance and “hegemonism” argue that China still needs U.S. trade and investment. By separating “political and economic relations with the U.S.,” says one Western diplomat, Chinese officials will “dance out of this mess.”

Eventually. The Clinton administration had hoped Pickering could lower tensions enough to revive talks on China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, in return for wider foreign access to China’s markets. In April Clinton had turned down concessions offered by Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, figuring that any WTO deal would be rejected by China-bashers in Congress. Only later did the White House learn that the deal had broad support, and that they had undercut Zhu for nothing. Now, in the wake of the bombing, Zhu and his aides face a tougher time selling a WTO deal to China’s hard-liners, who want to see a more convincing kowtow before they agree to more open trade.