How bad are we Americans at nation-building? As a journalist embedded with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment until last month, I saw it firsthand. It was not the dire reports of Coalition casualties and Iraqi insurgents that I found the most disturbing. The attacks were spread out, the enemy unorganized and ill trained. And most Iraqis I met were ecstatic to be liberated. It was the performance of the American military and civilian command that left me with a deep sense of foreboding for Iraq’s future: we lacked even a basic understanding of Iraq and the effects of Saddam Hussein’s rule. We suffered from poor or nonexistent coordination and communication–even between Americans. In short, we didn’t have a clue.
An example: in Al Qaim, where I spent about five weeks, the locals constantly complained of a lack of gasoline, often citing it as evidence of the U.S. failure to fix things. Local U.S. commanders agonized over how to obtain some–even arranging to send trucks hundreds of miles to try to buy it. Thus it came as quite a shock when they discovered that local gas stations were sitting on top of tens of thousands of gallons. Why hadn’t the owners opened? They were waiting for word from Baghdad, and besides, they explained, nobody had asked. Further investigation revealed that the local bank had $80,000 worth of Iraqi dinars in government payroll money, but hadn’t thought to issue paychecks–even as people were beginning to run short on food.
Down in Fallujah, locals complained that the schools had not reopened. The schoolmasters wanted instructions from the defunct Ministry of Education. The indecision filtered down to the lives of ordinary people: even today at many military installations, locals wait outside to get a “pass” to travel. When told they don’t need one, they often refuse to leave until they are issued one anyway.
Until now, the occupying forces hadn’t shown much interest in rebuilding a new center of power in Baghdad to replace the old Soviet-style state. And of course, centralized management is not the only way to run a government. What’s disturbing is that it’s unclear whether the Bush administration even recognizes the problem–let alone if it has a viable idea of how to fill the vacuum. Back in Washington, government officials are still singing the praises of free-market capitalism and waiting for Iraqis to demonstrate the go-getter initiative one might expect from a new businessman setting up shop in Austin, Texas. In Iraq, U.S. soldiers grouse that “it’s their country. If there’s a problem, the Iraqis should fix it.”
But living in an environment where Saddam’s henchmen cut off people’s tongues for telling politically incorrect jokes didn’t exactly promote Texas-style initiative or risk-taking. “They’re like these baby birds in a nest waiting for people to tell them what’s going to happen tomorrow,” says Lt. Col. Bill Dolan, who spent three months in Iraq leading a squadron. “They’re so used to living under a totalitarian regime, they don’t know what to do.”
For the most part, it is the soldiers in their occupation zones who are reluctantly dealing with problems. Most of them admit they received no training in government administration–or even peacekeeping–for the Iraq mission, so they’ve been forced to “make it up as we go along.” When orders do come from Baghdad, they often come with little warning and sometimes contravene efforts put in place by local commanders.
Even when engaged in the crucial task of re-establishing security, Baghdad often seemed disturbingly distracted. In mid-June, for instance, Dolan and his men prepared for weeks to attack a cave complex where they believed a former military commander on the Pentagon’s Most Wanted list was hiding out. Planes were summoned from offshore, artillery rolled out, helicopters flown in. But when the Americans arrived at the caves one morning, they found them abandoned. Two days later they were surprised to learn from a reporter that CENTCOM had already captured the commander–the day before the costly raid on the caves. Nobody had bothered to tell the regiment.
In light of all this, the new governing council–and the arrival of actual Iraqis who understand their nation–is a welcome development. What’s needed now is strong central leadership and a vision from experts with the plans–and the experience–to get Iraq up and running. Perhaps the Iraqis will have the sense and humility to seek them out. We didn’t.
