The way Askari sees it, U.S. troops will stay in Iraq bolstering his government, despite its unmet benchmarks, because the country is too important to let slip into what he predicts would be a regional war and an Al Qaeda resurgence. Any attempt to engineer the ouster of a government with the support of the Shiite masses would be such an open abandonment of democratic principles that U.S. officials could not condone it, he figures. And it would likely touch off all-out civil war. Meanwhile, Askari is confident those grassroots Shiites will support this government despite its shortcomings, because they know that internal division could end up leaving them again a persecuted, second-class majority, as they were under Saddam.
His only concern, interviewed a couple of hours before the start of Monday’s appearance by Gen. David Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, was whether the report could turn into a condemnation of the government and give ammunition to Sunni Muslims seeking a U-turn to the bad old days of Sunni domination. Contacted Tuesday, he was satisfied that the hearings would not give solace to his rivals. “It was a good report,” he said. “Some people expected [more] negative things in Crocker’s report.”
Sunnis, of course, saw it with converse disappointment. Parliamentarian Ahmed Suleiman al-Awani is a tribal leader from Ramadi in Anbar province, which U.S. commanders showcase when trying to show progress in Iraq. He focuses on what the hearings did not cover. Why wasn’t more time spent dealing with Iranian-backed Shiite militias with government connections that terrorize the Sunnis? What about the attempts to marginalize and ignore the Sunni members of the government? And in addition to what he sees as the sparse mention of the failings of the Shiite-led government, a favorite Sunni topic, the Americans were taking credit for the indigenous Anbar province offensive against Al Qaeda, for which Sunnis paid a heavy price in blood. “The problems of Anbar were not solved by the [Iraqi] government or the Americans. They were solved by the Sunni tribes,” Awani grouses.
That’s not to say Shiite leaders would give “A” marks to the oral midterm turned in by Petraeus and Crocker. They fault the Americans for not empowering Iraqi government forces quicker and with heavier weaponry. And Askari notes that in its alliance with the Kurds, the Shiite coalition could push through that benchmark legislation wanted by the U.S. policymakers. But American diplomats, he says, keep urging them to find consensus with the Sunnis. That, he says, just emboldens the Sunnis to hold out for more.
A soft-spoken, genial man, Askari isn’t known for throwing down partisan gauntlets, but he lets one slip, either in a real sense of confidence or a cagey counterpunch to all the criticism. He notes that Sunnis opposed and boycotted the first Iraqi elections but later joined the political process when they saw themselves marginalized. If the Americans would just adopt the so-called “80 percent option,” backing the Shiite and Kurdish blocks who claim that share of the population, the Sunnis would capitulate again. “If we go on without them,” he says calmly, “they will join [later].”
With Iraqi staff
